Thursday, October 7, 2010

Will Xi eventually succeed Hu? – New Perspective Based on Latest China Political Development (Part 2 of 3)

The second school of thought is the fact that Xi was not appointed the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission at the Fourth Plenum of the 17th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. This came as a big surprise to many. Observers like Cheng Li, a political analyst at the Brookings Institution in Washington, felt that this could be the start of a phase where China will spread out the power of the top leader into various hands, unlike the past where top leaders must hold on to leadership to the party, nation and military.
However, this is unlikely as Deng Xiaoping, in a speech entitled “The Top Priority of the Third Collective Leadership”, elaborated on the importance of power consolidation on one core personality as the top leader. Jiang Zemin was the first beneficiary of this policy and Hu was the second. The previous time two leaders shared the party, country and military power, the disastrous Tiananmen incident of 1989 took place. No matter how much infighting is taking place in China amongst the different factions, no one party would desire such political instability. As such, with political stability as the top concern of the leaders, it is unlikely that, be it Hu or the retired elders who still have voting rights to select top leadership candidates, China would see a situation where the leadership of the party, country and military fall in different hands.

Wong Teck Yenn

Wednesday, October 6, 2010

Will Xi eventually succeed Hu? – New Perspective Based on Latest China Political Development (Part 1 of 3)

Recently, China political observers have been entertaining a new thought – that the heir apparent to Hu Jintao might not be Xi Jinping after all. While such rumors are rampant and ongoing due to the lack of openness of the political culture in China, there are at least three different schools of thoughts to support these speculations.
The first school of thought is based on the Shanghai World Expo this year.  On the 30 April, Shanghai World Expo was officially launched at the World Expo Cultural Centre. All the standing committee members for the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”) Politburo (the most important 9-men team to determine every political aspects of China) were present except for Wen Jiabao, Wu Bangguo and Jia Qinglin.
The whole event, which will last for six months, was initially budgeted to cost US$4.2 billion, which is twice the amount for the Olympics in 2008.  However, according to the China media, actual amount spent could blow up to as high as US$58 billion. This was captured and commented by the western media to be an opportunity for China to flex its muscle to show its prowess. It is precisely because China views this event with utmost importance that political observers noticed an interesting and suggestive scenario during the opening ceremony. As is all major activities attended by Chinese national leaders, during the TV broadcast of the opening ceremony, the six present politburo standing committee members appeared in the sequence of Hu Jintao, Li Changchun, Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, He Guoqiang and Zhou Yongkang. The total opening ceremony was divided into two parts. After the ceremony at the Cultural Center, the national leaders and guests proceeded to the Huangpu VIP arena for the fireworks display.
In this second part of the opening, the camera first captured Hu and his wife, then turned to fireworks display. Next on TV, in sequence, were Li Changchun, Li Keqiang and Zhou Yongkang, and then the fireworks. Half a minute later, Xi Jinping (the heir apparent to Hu), He Guoqiang and Wang Qishan were featured. This sequence raised much discussion amongst scholars and observers. Even though Li Keqiang was seating beside Li Changchun and not Hu, the fact that he appeared earlier after Hu than Xi raised speculations. The sequence, frequency and conditions of official media appearance in China politics, especially with the presence of President Hu, are considered very sensitive and highly controlled issues.
At the same time, both Xi and Li arrived in Shanghai on 29 April. The official media provided extensive reports on these two fifth-generation leaders. Upon close study of these coverage (which is a common practice in order to decipher the hidden messages in an otherwise not-so-transparent China government), analysts felt that the 29th reports gave more coverage for Xi while the 30th coverage skewed towards Li.
First, let’s look at Xi’s activities. On the 29th, accompanied by Li Yuanchao, Xi toured the Shanghai World Expo Park. According to the official Xinhua news, Xi toured the various pavilions of China, United Nations, Germany, Denmark and North Korea. The official media provided extensive and detailed coverage of the pavilions that he visited. In the evening, he met up with Columbia’s Vice President Francisco Santos. The following day, Xi had a meeting with the President of the Sixty-Fourth Session of the United Nations General Assembly Dr. Ali Abdussalam Treki.
Next, let’s look at Li’s coverage. On the 30th, Li visited several of the above pavilions as Xi did. Thereafter, he met up with Greece’s Deputy Prime Minister Theodoros Pangalos and the former president of Chile Michelle Bachelet Jeria separately. Li discussed several cooperation opportunities with them and the discussions were reported in the media.
From the above, in the absence of Premier Wen, Vice-Premier Li, who was supposedly the preferred successor by Hu, appeared to have more extensive and in-depth news coverage relative to Xi.
During the days of Mao Zedong, when the political positional structure was not exactly clear cut, the way academics and analysts, both in and out of China, used to determine the political status of individuals was by the type and extent of media coverage. For example, when Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were in power, they were always seen next to Mao in official pictures in the media. After the Great Leap Forward and the commencement of the Cultural Revolution, both Liu and Deng were never spotted beside Mao. Replacing them in the official media pictures was Lin Biao, who was made the unofficial heir apparent of Mao.
According to scholar Alan Liu, in the article “The Politics of Corruption in the People's Republic of China” published in the American Political Science Review, all political media coverage in the China official press must be preapproved by the propaganda department. This means that all politically sensitive issues have been thought through and whatever published should be in conjunction with the CCP’s policies. In this case, while it is commonly believed that Xi will succeed Hu in 2012, the fact that Li appeared earlier than Xi, as mentioned above, and that Li had more positive and extensive coverage during this high profile event seemed to hint of a possible power shift, if a parallel is drawn to that of Mao.

Saturday, October 2, 2010

The New Four Elite Families (Chinese Communism after Mao and Deng – Part 5)

While it has been commonly accepted that the intensity of corruption during Deng Xiaoping’s era was not serious as compared to today, there was still a saying of the Four Elite Families in Beijing back then (in comparison to the four Elite Families within Taiwan’s Kuomintang of Jiang, Song, Kong, and Chen). This referred to the families of Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Ye Jianyiing and Wang Zhen.

According to Chinese political observers, Beijing has lately emerged a New Elite Family listing originated from the fortune ranking of the new Princelings. Ranked first is the son of Zhu Rongji – Zhu Yunlai[1]. Second place is Zeng Qinghong’s son – Zeng Wei[2]. Third place goes to Wen Jiabao’s son – Wen Yunsong[3]. And the fourth position belongs to Jiang Zemin’s son – Jiang Mianheng[4].

Hence, the New Four Elite Families of the CCP was unofficially borne. However, observers are keeping their fingers crossed on the sustainability of these Princeling’s fortunes after the 18th CCP Congress, as the heir apparent of Hu Jintao – Xi Jinping – has appeared to be a very anti-corruption leader hitherto.

(………… coming up next: The return of the previous nobles ……………..)

Wong Teck Yenn


[1]朱鎔基和儿子朱云来的基本资料”, 30 December 2009, <http://hi.baidu.com/syp2284/blog/item/d10e7d3e7c5f8bc97c1e713a.html>
[2]曾庆红的儿子曾伟逃到澳洲,说明什么?”, 27 April 2010, <http://www.boxun.com/hero/201004/zhouyahui/43_1.shtml>
[3] 与李泽楷拍档经商 温家宝儿子温云松活跃商场”, Kan Zhongguo, 19 July 2010, <http://www.kanzhongguo.com/node/359864>
[4] 江泽民的儿子 江绵恒的「生财之道”, Epoch Times, 28 November 2003, <http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/3/11/28/n419956.htm>

Friday, October 1, 2010

The era of Jiang Zemin’s (江泽民) utilitarianism (Chinese Communism after Mao and Deng – Part 4)

Some Chinese political observers felt that Deng Xiaoping, while being the greatest contributor to the flourishing success of today’s China, made two important mistakes in his life. The first is to belief heavily in the reports of Li Peng and Chen Xitong to use military forces to clamp down on the protesting students during the June 4 Incident at Tiananmen in 1989. The second is to choose a successor, after the Tiananmen Incident, who is an extreme capitalist-natured person as the secretary general – Jiang Zemin. While Deng has always proclaimed himself to be a great observer, he was not able to foretell Jiang’s instinct to deviate away from socialism.

As a result of the Tiananmen Incident, Jiang rose to power within the CCP. Deng wanted him to correct the corrupted situation during the pre-Tiananmen days. However, even before the passing away of Deng, wide activities of corruption were to take place in the Chinese government. According to analysts, Jiang’s son – Jiang Mianheng (姜绵恒) – was one of those that benefited materially from both being an official and a businessman.

If we study the corruption situation in the pre-1989 days, the students protested against corruption and bureaucratism only due to Deng Pufang (邓普方) organizing a few companies making use of the loophole during the transition period between planned to market economy to generate unlawful income for him. However, Deng Pufang’s company at that time was a State Owned Enterprise. All proceeds will eventually go to the Chinese handicapped funds. Yet, the company was still scrutinized publicly and was “cleansed” and reorganized in September 1988.

The amount of questionable funds that is taking place twenty years later is anytime greater in magnitude as compared to Deng Pufang’s case. The princelings listed by observers include Jiang Mianheng (as first described above), Li Xiaolin[1], Zeng Wei[2], Zhu Yunlai[3], Wen Yunsong[4]. And the list goes on. The above-mentioned characters of paramount family backgrounds have all became wealthy whether as a businessman or as a government official. While there are many accusations of the legality issue of their getting rich, this paper will not indulge in non-referenced speculations, which will be left to the many tabloids that can do a much better job in this.

In comparison to 1989, the current corruption situation within the government officials is many times more intense. Some famously reported cases include that of Chen Liangyu[5], Zhu Junyi[6] and Du Shicheng[7]. As a result, the repercussion is also much bigger than in 1989. In fact, the events commemorating the June 4 incident both in China and overseas are growing in strength these days as a result of the growing corruption.

While Deng has been criticized for allowing the Tiananmen massacre, he certainly demonstrated his integrity in the areas of corruption. When Zhao Ziyang reported to Deng about the civilians’ dissatisfaction of the families of senior cadres being involved in business, Deng immediately dictated that anti-corruption activities should start from their own families. As a result, Deng Pufang’s company was persecuted. Zhao Ziyang also followed suit by calling for investigation against his son Zhao Dajun’s (赵大军) company. The widely speculated joke about the reaction of Jiang Zemin today should someone report to him about people’s dissatisfaction against the princelings is that he will order the speculators to be arrested first.

(………… coming up next: The new Four Elite Families ……………..)


[1] Daughter of Li Peng. Please refer to previous piece on Li Peng for more information.
[2] Son of Zeng Qinghong (曾庆红).
[3] Son of former premier Zhu Rongji.
[4] Son of current premier Wen Jiabao.
[5] Chen was the former Shanghai mayor, who is notoriously known to be a protégé of Jiang Zemin.
[6] Zhu has been the protégé of Chen Liangyu for many years and was involved in one of the biggest scandals in China involving the Shanghai Social Security Funds together with Chen.
[7] Du was the former Qingdao mayor who was apprehended for abusing his power and amassing huge fortunes through illegal land sales in Qingdao.