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During the era of Mao Zedong, there were no significant parties or factions existing due to his strong personality cult.[1] In contrast, the upcoming 18th Chinese Communist Party Congress appears to be the most and longest awaited Congress so far. Much discussions, publications and criticisms of the 18th Congress has emerged. As a summary of the many views published in various publications, it is typically believed that Chinese politics would not witness any fundamental radical changes before the 18th Congress. This is because there are simply no incentives for the current leaders to engage in activities that might devastate their painstakingly-built political legacy. As such, only with the new leaders on board would China have the prerequisites and dynamics to transform. At the same time, the minority but powerful group of political and business elites would have every incentive to ensure that they do not lose out on this opportunity to derive maximum benefits in this round of power transition.
Based on the above, this paper will attempt to discuss the following issues: Assuming they will be some surprises or unexpected results in the 18th Congress, what will they be? Who would be the real decision makers in this round of succession? Does factionalism still play a part in the current elite politics?
Many will be able to provide some forms of answers to the above-mentioned issues based on factors, including (1) the reconciliation of facts between the previous Congresses and the current political environment; (2) some hearsays of rumors from tabloids; (3) personal wish-list and imaginations. However, one thing is for sure. No one will be able to furnish a perfectly comprehensive answer, including the senior leaders of the CCP due to the lack of uncertainty in the true and absolute political strength of the various factions and parties.
As such, all discussions on the upcoming 18th CCP Congress became mysterious and interesting. Due to the lack of an official academic model to forecast the results, such discussions cannot be strictly classified as political science. However, it is a good basis for academics and scholars to dissect the different aspects of this power succession process to deduce meaningful discussions on the topic, especially when China is now the second largest economy in the world after the United States and that political leadership change in China could potentially affect the world both positively and negatively.
The surprises that could possibly happen for the 18th CCP Congress
At first glance, the following passage appears to be predictive in nature. In actual fact, the “surprises” presented below are based on what actually happened in history as a basis to form deductions of what should rightfully happen in the 18th Congress. The method adopted in this paper is to use the contrary description to state what is most unlikely to happen, assuming ceteris paribus.
Ever since the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, the four CCP Congresses thereafter all produced surprising results in one way or another. These surprises are summarized as follow.
Before the 14th CCP Congress in 1992, which was the first CCP Congress after the Tiananmen Massacre, the military were unpopular with the people.[2] However, within the political scene, the military remained powerful. The Yang Jiajiang (Yang Shangkun and his sibling) possessed great authority within the military, which had the unofficial influence over the country and party then. However, with the change of mind of Deng Xiaoping, the Yang Jiajiang was removed from power abruptly for trying to replace Jiang as party leader. Hu Jintao, a new political star then, surfaced out of the blue.
Before the 15th CCP Congress in 1997, there were speculations and strong beliefs that Qiaoshi would rise to replace Jiang Zemin. The result is the opposite. Qiaoshi was removed from power while Jiang continued to consolidate power.
Before the 16th CCP Congress in 2002, power transition from Jiang to Hu was within expectation and proceeded smoothly. However, Li Ruihuan was made to retire, which was relatively unexpected.
Before the 17th CCP Congress in 2007, the Communist Youth League (hereinafter referred to as “Tuanpai” or “CYL” interchangeably) was greatly in position for power consolidation. Observers generally believe that the successor of the three Hu’s[3] – Li Keqiang – would emerge as the heir apparent. However, newly appointed Shanghai Chief – Xi Jinping – unexpectedly became the crown prince while Li had to settle with the second place.
While history might or might not repeat itself, surprises within the CCP politics has become common. Hence, this paper conducted a qualitative survey, in the form of interviews, with some political observers, including political journalists, political science students, researchers on China affairs etc, to make a study of what type of surprises could constitute as surprise in the coming 18th CCP Congress in 2012, i.e. what should take place in this congress such that observers deem it totally surprising due to its unlikely nature. The below four surprises are the most commonly mentioned ones by interviewees. While these surprises were not listed in order during the interview, after consolidating the top ten most commonly listed surprises, this list was given to the interviewees again for ranking purpose. The results listed below demonstrate the surprise level of the interviewees, from the highest surprise index downwards.
- The biggest surprise that could happen would be Hu Jintao continuing his leadership post. While the large numbers of Tuanpai and supporters would enjoy this decision of Hu’s, however, it has become an unofficial practice that party general secretaries should serve only two terms. This is in parallel to the term period of elected presidents in democracies. A prolonged term would do more harm than good to Hu’s hitherto positive political legacy.
- The second biggest surprise would be Xi failing to inherit the crown. Even though many such concerns have surfaced since Xi was not elected as the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, there is so far no pertinence to support such speculations. Xi has been careful to keep a stable profile without appearing ambitious and eager to shine. Also, Xi is now an important figurehead for various factions in China politics, and is hence a symbol of stability.[4]
- The third biggest surprise would be that Li Keqiang would be bereaved of even his seat of a Premier, and to merely end up as a standing committee member, and that Wang Qishan becomes the Premier instead. The likelihood is of course low. While Wang is known for his fire-fighting capabilities, his Princeling symbol has however lowered such a possibility. This likelihood of Wang becoming Premier will only increase if Xi fails to succeed Hu. This is believed to be a balance of power amongst the factions so that no one faction can take on both the Presidential and Premier positions.
- The fourth biggest surprise would be a fallout amongst the factions, which will result in the politburo standing committee size to either expand or shrink. Borderline candidates like Ling Jihua, Yu Zhengsheng and Liu Yandong’s chances of entering the standing committee will be directly affected by it.
The above-mentioned four scenarios are expected to be the biggest potential boat-rocking factors, which are extremely unlikely to happen. One noteworthy point is that after 1989’s Tiananmen Incident, surprises are much more “tamed” than before. There are no more major purges or losing of lives[5], but more of rhythmic transfer of power in return for material richness and comfort.[6] This is definitely in line with the party’s principle for national and political stability.
The ultimate decision makers for Chinese politics
Having discussed what is most unlikely to happen, let us now discuss who the most likely ultimate decision makers are in Chinese politics today. In the pursuit for scientific development, today’s CCP is filled with many structural rules and guidelines. This includes the correlation between age and promotion; educational level; the requirement for party education every five years; provincial governors and city mayors also have to be assessed, based on a set of Key Performance Indicators (KPI) including economic growth, investment, local air and water pollution level and public stability. At the same time, the Organization Department of CCCPC have also adopted the tactics used by headhunter-companies to make a candidate due for promotion to undergo psychology and lie detection tests, and to also conduct secret investigations by interviewing their colleagues and friends.
However, this scientific method is not fool-proof. The young cadres of today can easily match the listed requirements, be it education level or governmental experience. As such, in terms of the scientific way of measurement, the outstanding young cadres are on equal foot path. Hence, ceteris paribus, their career futures will then be determined by the true decision maker(s). A popular phrase is now commonly heard in China: No matter if it’s a black cat or white cat, as long as it’s spotted by the leader, then it’s a good cat.[7]
Who, then, are the decision makers of the highest level of Chinese politics? According to discussions with various political journalists and scholars, the following elders’ names are almost automatically ruled out: Li Peng, Zhu Rongji, Qiao Shi, Li Ruihuan, Wu Guanzheng, Li Lanqing, Luo Gan and Liu Huaqing. Most observers conclude that the true influential decision makers for the 18th CCP Congress are the following four: Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao and Zeng Qinghong.
Jiang, in comparison to Hu, has been a controversial leader in the recent China. Observers believe that as long as his health permits, he might have a stronger influencing strength over Hu in the 18th CCP Congress. Till today, Jiang Zemin has been the main supporter of Xi Jinping’s rise. Xi’s progressions from Fujian to Zhejiang and Shanghai have been endorsed by Jiang as many scholars have already written on Xi being Jiang’s and Zeng Qinghong’s protégé. Xi serves as a very good balance of power against the Tuanpai. By preventing an entirely one-sided factional (Tuanpai) control in Chinese politics, this opens up the doors to many different possibilities in the development of Chinese politics.
To Jiang and Zeng, their support for Xi is almost an unwavering one. Despite the fact that they do have a backup choice of Li Yuanchao, who is also favored by Hu, however, it is obvious that they would rather have Xi, who pledges loyalty to them, rather than Li Yuanchao who is affiliated to both sides. This is more logically analyzed when the Tuanpai already has Li Keqiang to take over as the Premier. Hence, as far as possible, Jiang and Zeng would prefer to have someone like Xi, who has no Tuanpai background at all, to takeover Hu.
As the secretary general, Hu has the legitimacy to make comprehensive decisions. Since the 16th CCP Congress, we have already witnessed Hu adopting a strategy of using localities to enclose centrality. This means other than the main and important provinces and cities like Beijing and Shanghai, many other provinces and cities are filled with cadres related to Tuanpai.
We can certainly see the fruits of Hu’s hard work in the future of China politics. This will ensure that Hu’s legacy will carry on despite retiring. However, one question deserves to be asked: Will he repeat the pattern of Deng and Jiang to insist on appointing the subsequent leader after Xi? Or at least, will he be able to bring Ling Jihua into the politburo standing committee? This question justifies us to revert back to the factionalism model by Andrew Nathan.
A factionalism struggle between the Tuanpai, Taizidang and Mishubang[8]
Andrew Nathan says that Chinese politics can be conveniently structured and be studied by factionalism. He defines factions as being based on “clientelist ties”, and that it is cultivated through the constant exchange of goods and favors. While this rule is unwritten, players well understood the rights and obligations among factional members. According to this model, factions are incapable of building sufficient power to rid of political system of rival factions. The most important task of a faction is to protect its own base of power while opposing accretions of power by other factions.
Under such a basis, today’s China does witness the existence of many factions, including Tuanpai, Taizidang, Mishubang, and Guangdongbang[9] etc. However, the so-called Tuanpai, Taizidang and Mishubang are not politically meaningful and accurate according to the impression we derive from their names. This is because, while they are called “dang” or “bang” (both means either factions or parties), they don’t really function as factions or parties. In fact, the characters classified within the same gang might not even be on good terms due to previous political or commercial baggage. The converse is true. For example, Bo Zhiyue is of the view that the different figures in these different factions might not even be political enemies. One key example he mentioned is that even though Hu Jintao was not the choice of Jiang as successor, Jiang did eventually accept Hu for his capabilities and even helped to promote Hu to important positions in both the party and government.
However, these factional classifications are very visually appealing and seemed to fit into the political geographical or physical reality of China. Hence, they became popularized.
With the rise of figures like Hu Yaobang, Hu Qili, Hu Jintao and Li Keqiang, observers view the Tuanpai as a trend for future country leadership. It is true that many current provincial chiefs carry some form of Tuanpai experience in their resume. However, this is also related to the fact that the elders urgently needed to start building the third generation leaders during the eighties. As such, the Communist Youth League became a convenient stepping stone for the offspring of political leaders to quickly gain some credential and mileage in Chinese politics. It is noteworthy that those periods were still guided by ideology. The CYL was hence appealing to the youngsters with their ideological slogans and campaigns.
Over the past years, the CYL has grown in strength. However, the recognition for their efforts has declined. This is especially true for professional CYL cadres (“PCC”) who were transferred to sectors or departments with actual power for pragmatic organization operations. These PCC inevitably appeared helpless. For example, should a military commander be transferred to an SOE to manage a corporation, it will be relatively challenging for the former commander. This is because private corporations require fast turnkey solutions to economic growth and effective corporate leadership, which is a total contrast to the military style of management. Hence, these PCCs are frequently viewed as beautiful structures with no actual abilities.
Li Keqiang is, unfortunately, the victim of such views. While Li is known to be intelligent and full of prospects with Henan and Liaoning Provincial management experience, he was however not loaded with outstanding results. As such, his acquired political credit is inferior to that of even Li Yuanchao, Bo Xilai and Wang Yang.[10] His greatest challenge is the striking similarity with Hu Jintao. On the contrary, Wang Yang and Wang Qishan both have their own characteristics, which make them more distinct and noticeable. As such, going forward, the probability of PCC becoming highest ranking officials will diminish. This will naturally result in a weakening of the self-identity as a Tuanpai member. While the name Tuanpai will always exist for the convenient purpose of political-experiential classification, it will potentially become more symbolic rather than pragmatic.
It is highly expected that the number of Tuanpai members in the politburo and central committee for the coming 18th CCP Congress will be high, as discussed above. The leading Tuanpai figures will likely be Li Keqiang, Li Yuanchao and Ling Jihua.
In comparison to the Tuanpai, the Taizidang will actually be a stronger force in the 18th Congress in political strength. The above-mentioned three Tuanpai members – Li Keqiang, Li Yuanchao and Ling Jihua – are in actual fact the offspring of high ranking officials, otherwise known as the post revolution generation. Li Yuanchao’s father – Li Gancheng – was an important CCP official in east China, which explains why CCP elderly Chen Pixian[11] was keen to groom him; Li Keqiang’s father was a district chief in the fifties, with the rank of a deputy head of a department under the provincial government. His father-in-law – Cheng Jinrui – was already a provincial deputy party secretary in Henan before the Cultural Revolution; Ling Jihua’s father was also a retired deputy provincial level official. On top of this, Xi Jinping, Wang Qishan, Bo Xilai, Yu Zhengsheng, Liu Yandong, and the princelings from the military carry with them influential family background. While there might not be absolute cohesion amongst them, the royal blood is nevertheless still flowing amongst them inherently.
However, the Chinese theory of “fu buguo san dai” (wealth will not last past three generations) seems to apply to the above-mentioned princelings in the political sense. To date, there seems to be no hint of political successors amongst the offspring of them. While most of their children have accumulated huge wealth or obtained top academic qualifications from foreign schools, their likelihood of entering politics is low.
As part of informal politics, the Mishubang – or secretary gang – is probably the largest “shadow gang”. The reason why it’s classified as the “shadow gang” is because it is extremely prevalent in terms of qualified members, yet the lack of coherence makes it totally non-functional as a gang. During the era of the CCP seniors, secretaries play an important role of duty-execution for the senior cadres. This could be due to reasons including the frail health or the lack of education and culture to adequately present oneself amongst the senior cadres. The secretaries for Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun were themselves senior cadres. Hence, even Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang and Jiang Zemin had to be respectful to these secretaries. When Jiang was newly promoted to party secretary general in 1989 and was staying in the states hostel, the secretary of Song Renqiong – Liu Zepeng, who was also the deputy minister of Organization Department of CCCPC – was also staying in the same hostel. Liu was supposeddly not entirely respectful to this new secretary general. Of course, with the demise of the elders’ political career, the new generation leaders are better educated and qualified and hence, the political functions of secretaries were greatly reduced to merely lifestyle secretaries to handle minor and micro stuffs like daily work schedules. Very shortly, Liu Zepeng was disparaged, while another secretary – Wang Yi, who was serving Bo Yibo – was even imprisoned.
The only secretaries that used to serve the elder cadres and did well in recent politics were Zeng Qinghong and Xi Jinping. Zeng served Yu Qiuli while Xi served Geng Biao (耿飆). Yu was the vice premier of China from 1975 until 1982, a member of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo and also the Deputy Secretary-General of China's Military Commission while Geng was the minister of national defense, state councilor, vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (1983).
One noteworthy case is that of Ling Jihua. Ling is acknowledged to be particularly assiduous and meticulous. He will always visit the places that Hu intend to visit in advance, and to vet all news release with regards to Hu. Due to his humble character, he received minimal objections in his promotion during the 17th CCP Congress. As such, observers typically believe that Hu will groom him into the politburo standing committee during the coming 18th Congress in continuation of their patron-client relationship.
Another prominent Mishubang member is Jiang Yikang (姜異康). As the secretary for Li Peng in the late eighties to early nineties, and the party secretary for Shandong province, Jiang is a potential candidate to become a politburo member. However, as a professional secretary, his fate will depend on himself and not Li Peng.
Hence, in today’s China politics, secretaries should volunteer to work in the grassroots as early as possible in order to gain the opportunity for political career progression. Otherwise, when their patrons retire, such secretaries will normally be bereaved of their political backing for promotions.
Conclusion
As a conclusion, the stated regulations and policies in China are still not entirely up to date with the modern society, especially when China is set to become the top economy of the world. The coming 18th CCP Congress successor selection process will remain dynamic and dramatic due to the non-transparency and speculative nature of Chinese politics. It is only when the core members of Tuanpai, Taizidang and Mishubang retire will the politics of blood-relation, ideology and black box in the CCP diminish. By then, political figures will be standing on political stage and not the current party-chairman stage.
Based on the above-mentioned third and fourth generation’s remnant of the factionalism influence, true transformation of Chinese politics can only truly begin during the 20th CCP Congress in 2022, under the future sixth generation leaders.
Wong Teck Yenn
Wong Teck Yenn
[1] While liberalists like Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were able to secure some power away from Mao after the Great Leap Forward, they do not constitute any particular factions as in today’s context like the Shanghai Gang or Tuanpai. They were also easily suppressed with some power manipulation by Mao.
[2] The 27th and 38th Armies of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) were sent to control the situation in Tiananmen Square, with the commander of the former being a nephew to Yang Shangkun. Due to the success [sic] of the crackdown of the student protestors, Yang won favor with Deng Xiaoping and became even more powerful in the PLA.
[3] The three Hu’s from the Tuanpai typically refers to Hu Yaobang, Hu Qili and Hu Jintao.
[4] Xi, being the son of Xi Zhongxun, is currently the unofficial leading man for the Princelings. At the same time, his proximity to both Zeng Qinghong and Jiang Zemin automatically classifies him as a Shanghai Gang. Furthermore, he is also labeled as part of another less prominent gang, known as the Mishubang, or Secretary Gang, which comprises all political players who once served as secretaries to high ranking officials in their initial career path.
[5] Examples include the purging of Peng Zhen, Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, the loss of lives due to the crashing of Lin Biao’s plane and major arrests of the Gang of Four.
[6] The offspring of Zhu Rongji, Li Peng, Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong have been reported to be some of the richest businessmen amongst the Princelings. Also, Hu has made it a point that all the retired high ranking cadres will be fully taken care of by the state such that most of these elders have no incentives to take extreme stands against Hu when it comes to voting for important affairs.
[7] This is an adaptation from Deng Xiaoping’s famous quotation of “No matter if it is a white cat or a black cat; as long as it can catch mice, it is a good cat”.
[8] The Mishubang, or the Secretary Gang, is merely a convenient way to classify all the political leaders who have once served as secretaries in their political careers.
[9] Guagdongbang, or Guangdong Gang, is the remnant of General Ye Jianying’s legacy. This is again a term to loosely group officials who have served under Ye or Ye’s factions over the years.
[10] Wang Yang has demonstrated his dynamic and forceful character of implementing reforms for Guangdong province to boost its GDP, even at the expense of disregarding Premier Wen Jiabao’s wish to retain labor intensive factories within the Pearl Delta River region. Bo Xilai achieved several significant results including making Dalian the most economically advanced city in northern China and massive clamping down of provincial corruption in Liaoning. Li Yuanchao was lauded for his efforts in the 2007 Taihu Lake algae pollution incident.
[11] Chen Pixian was a high official of the Communist Party of China. He became a Secretary of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee in 1982, and was the Secretary of the CPC Central Political and Legislative Affairs Committee from 1982 to 1985. He was said to be politically close to Li Gancheng.
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